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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Assessment of the Orbiter Experiments FMEA/CIL
I. 0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, i0 October 1986.
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Orbiter
Experiments (OEX) hardware, generating draft failure modes and
potential critical items. To preserve independence, this
analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results
contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA
results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with
proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each
discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional
analysis as required. This report documents the results of that
comparison for the Orbiter OEX hardware.
The IOA product for the OEX analysis consisted of eighty two
failure mode "worksheets" that resulted in two potential critical
items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA baseline
(as of 1 May 1987) which consisted of one hundred ninety one FMEAs
and one CIL item. The difference in the number of IOA analysis
worksheets and NASA FMEAs can be explained by the different
levels of analysis detail performed to identify failure modes.
The comparison determined if there were any results which had
been found by the IOA but were not in the NASA baseline. This
comparison produced agreement on all but twenty four FMEAs which
caused differences in no CIL items. Figure 1 presents a
comparison of the proposed Post 51-L NASA baseline, with the IOA
recommended baseline, and any issues.
The issues arose due to differences between the NASA and IOA
FMEA/CIL preparation instructions. NASA had used an older ground
rules document which has since been superseded by the NSTS 22206
used by the IOA. After comparison, there were no discrepancies
found that were not already identified by NASA, and the remaining
issues may be attributed to differences in ground rules.
uu
I
uu
m
_o
us
m
or.o
Figure 1 - OEX FMEA/CIL ASSESSMENT
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the proposed Post 51-L Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and
technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the proposed Post 51-L NASA and Prime
Contractor FMEA/CIL. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL which is
documented in this report.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
i.i Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 Ground Rules and Assumptions
The ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are defined in
Appendix B.
3.0 SUBSYSTEMDESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The Orbiter experiments (OEX) consists of various sets of hardware
required to obtain precise data for physics, aerodynamics,
thermodynamics, structures, and materials on the orbiter in a flight
and orbital environment. Data for the OEX may be from existing
sensors in the operational instrumentation (OI), from sensors in the
development flight instrumentation (DFI), from new OEX unique
sensors, or from combinations of the above. Data recording of the
OEX data is provided by the payload recorder, operations recorder,
DFI recorder, OEX recorder, the MADS recorder, or combinations
thereof• Columbia, OV-102, is the main test-bed for the OEX.
Special unique structural interfaces are required for SEADS, SUMS
and SILTS, and thus these experiments are only on OV-102. The ACIP
experiment can be fitted to any orbiter.
The Orbiter Experiments consists of the following experiments and
support systems:
I. Shuttle Entry Air Data System (SEADS) experiment is designed
to reference air data (angle of attack, and angle of
sideslip) during the entire free-stream, dynamic pressure,
atmospheric flight envelope of the orbiter (Entry). Both
air pressure and temperature measurements are made to
determine temperature compensation of the pressure
measurements. The system comprises of 28 pressure
transducers (0- to 5- volt outputs), eight temperature
sensors (RTD's) which require signal conditioning, and six
radiometers which also require signal conditioning; all
located on the nose cone of the orbiter (Figure 2). 14
pressure ports, each containing two pressure transducers,
are flush-mounted orifices arranged in a cruciform pattern.
The pressure distribution obtained from these ports are used
to measure dynamic pressure, vehicle attitude, and state.
•
The Shuttle Upper Atmosphere Mass Spectrometer (SUMS)
measures the density and composition of the Earth atmosphere
beginning approximately 1 hour prior to orbiter re-
entry and continues down to an external inlet pressure of
5.18 torr (about IISK Feet)• It will provide total
atmosphere quantities in regions below that traversed by
Earth satellites and above that regularly assessed by ground
launched meteorological missions. The SUMS experiment is
made up of a gas inlet system and a pressurized enclosure
containing a mass spectrometer and electronic control
system. Data is fed to a PCM-slave which processes and
converts it into a format that can be transmitted to the PCM
master then to the recorder. The SUMS and PCM-slave are
mounted on the bulkhead at the forward end of the orbiter
nose landing gear wheel well with the inlet system fitted to
the lower fuselage surface in front of the nose wheel well
(Figure 3).
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• Part of the Forward Fuselage Support System for Orbiter
Experiments (FFSSO) provides for the collection and handling
of experiment data (SEADS and SUMS), while the other part
provides sensors for the measurement of static air pressure.
Six static pressure ports located on the forward fuselage
contain two pressure transducers each used to remove the
effects of dynamic pressure (from SEADS) as functions of
angle of attack and yaw. In addition, there are six
temperature measurements, one for each pair of pressure
transducers, for temperature compensation of the measured
pressures. There is also one temperature sensor on the PCM
slave to verify its health• Data is fed to the PCM slave in
the nose wheel well, to the PCM master, and then to the
recorder. The FFSSO consists also of all the electrical
cabling between transducers, sensors, PCM slave and PCM
master (Figure 4).
• Shuttle Infrared Leeside Temperature Sensor (SILTS)
experiment is used to obtain high-resolution temperatures of
the orbiter upper (leeside) surfaces during entry
aerodynamic flight. An infrared (IR) camera, mounted in a
pod on top of the vertical fin, is used to produce thermal
maps on the orbiter upper surface. These data will improve
orbiter operational capability through reduction of the
upper thermal protection system (TPS) which will reduce
weight and refurbishment costs. Experiment equipment
mounted within the pod includes pressure system module, data
and control (D&C) module, dome assembly/IR camera, and
window protection plugs (Figure 5). The pressure system
(GN2) provides coolant for the windows and IR camera and
also provides pressure for window plug release. The IR
camera alternately views the forward fuselage, black body,
and port wing during a 7-second cycle, controlled by camera
pointing circuitry in the D&C module. The D&C module also
provides an output data interface between the IR camera and
the OEX recorder via the ICM/SCM. Heaters in the pod are
activated by the crew after launch to regulate the pod
temperature between 60 and 80 degrees F throughout the
mission. During the entry switch configuration, the crew
will enable the experiment switches so that it will receive
a start command at entry interface (EI).
• The Aerodynamic Coefficient Identification Package (ACIP) is
to collect and measure the accelerations (linear in X, Y,
and Z and angular in ro11, pitch and yaw) and rates (roll,
pitch, and yaw) of the orbiter. The aerodynamic forces
cause the vehicle to slow down from orbital velocity to
landing speed during re-entry. The data collected by ACIP
is of greater resolution than the standard orbiter onboard
instrumentation. The ACIP hardware, mounted in a self-
contained package, consists of a Triaxial Accelerometer/Gyro
Instrument Package (TAGIP), Triaxial Angular Accelerometer
(TAA), Triaxial Vibration Sensor (TVS), Data-Handling
Electronics (DHE), and Mini Data-Handling Electronics
(MDHE). The package is located beneath the payload bay
.insulation liner near the longitudinal center of gravity
(Figure 6). The High-Resolution Accelerometer Package
(HIRAP) was added as a separate major subassembly. It
provides a third set of triaxial accelerometer sensors to
complement the TAGIP and TAA. Other ACIP associated
equipment are the Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) Master and a
PCM slave. The PCM master handles data from SEADS, SUMS and
FFSSO as well as ACIP. The PCM slave handles the analog
data from ACIP to the PCM master (Figure 7). Data from
these experiments is then routed to the ICM/SCM then to the
OEX recorder. Heaters are installed on the package to
maintain temperature greater than 45±5 degrees F during
orbital flight. Minimal crew participation is required,
since the experiment operations is performed by commands
from the ground. Operation is required during ascent, entry
and specific orbital tests.
The objective of the Support System for Orbiter Experiments
(SSO) is to provide control, conditioning, handling and
recording of the experiments data. The SSO consists of the
OEX Recorder, a control module [either the interface control
module (ICM) or the system control module (SCM)], and the
wiring and cabling. The equipment is located in the crew
compartment Volume D. As a result, the SSO is
removed on a Spacelab mission, since it requires this
space. The control module is the primary interface
between the OEX recorder and experiment instruments, and
the orbiter (Figure 8). It controls the OEX recorder
speed, record mode, and track selection along with
experiment power and mode. It is controlled via uplink
commands except for power and it has no telemetry. The
OEX recorder records all the OEX experiments data and
can only be accessed post-mission through ground support
equipment.
3.2 Interfaces and Location
The Orbiter Experiments hardware, for this analysis,
consists of four experiments and two support systems. The
interfaces for the OEX are relatively simple in that there
is a limited number of interfaces with subsystems on the
orbiter. Most experiments are controlled via uplink command
through the Communications System then through the Data
Processing System (DPS) to the experiment. Timing functions
are fed into PCMs for comparison and update to internal
time. Control surface measurements are input into the ACIP
experiment for comparison of their movement to the sensed
aerodynamics of the orbiter. Lastly, a few switches are
available on panel A7 for manual control of some of the
experiments. The location of each of the experiments,
support systems, and controls is shown in Figure 9.
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3.3 Hierarchy
Figure i0 illustrates the hierarchy of the OEX experiments and
the corresponding subcomponents. Figures 2 through 8 comprise
the detailed system representation.
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Figure 6 - ACIP EXPERIMENT
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Figure 8 - OEX SCM SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
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Figure i0 - ORBITER EXPERIMENTS OVERVIEW
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4.0 ABSESBMElq_ I_ESULTB
The IOA analysis of the OEX hardware initially generated eighty-
two (82) failure mode worksheets and identified two (2) Potential
Critical Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment process.
These analysis results were compared to the proposed NASA Post
51-L baseline of 191 FMEAs and one (I) CIL item, which was
generated using the older FMEA/CIL instructions. Upon completion
of the assessment, one-hundred sixty-seven (167) of the one-
hundred ninety-one (191) FMEAs were in agreement. Of the twenty-
four (24) that remained, twenty-one (21) were IOA 3/3 FMEAs on
component not addressed by NASA. Of the remaining three (3), two
(2) issues were with FMEAs criticality level. The remaining
issue concerns a FMEA on a component which no longer exist, thus
no FMEA needed.
In the following, the unmapped IOA column is the raw number of
IOA failure modes. The mapped IOA column is the number of IOA
failure modes after they have been mapped into the NASA FMEAs.
The issues column is the IOA failure modes that were unable to
be mapped onto FMEAs.
OEX IOA IOA
Sections UnmaDped MapPed NASA ISSUES
SEADS 5 1 1 4
SUMS 16 12 24* 4
FFSSO 5 3 3 2
SILTS 26 24 142" 2
ACIP 22 14 14 8
SSO 7 6 7 1
* Level of detail greater than other experiments and that
required in 22206.
A summary of the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table I.
[ Table I Summary of IOA FMEA Assessment [
4 +
[ Component NASA IOA Issues I
+
SEADS
SUMS
FFSSO
SILTS
ACIP
SSO
TOTAL
1
24
3
142
14
7
191
5
16
5
26
22
7
81
4
5
3
2
8
2
24
18
A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented
in Table II.
Table II ;ummary of IOA CIL Assessment
Component
SEADS
SUMS
FFSSO
SILTS
ACIP
SSO
TOTAL
NASA
1
I
I
m
IOA
1
Issues
n
0
Appendix C presents the detailed assessment worksheets for each
failure mode identified and assessed. Appendix D highlights the
NASA Critical Items and corresponding IOA worksheet ID. Appendix
E contains IOA analysis worksheets supplementing previous
analysis results reported in Space Transportation System
Engineering and Operations Support (STSEOS) Working Paper No.
1.0-WP-VA87005-01, Analysis of the OEX, 21 August 1987. Appendix
F provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA worksheet(s). IOA recommendations are also
summarized.
Table III presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure
criticalities for the Post 51-L FMEA baseline. Further
discussion of each of these subdivisions and the applicable
failure modes is provided in subsequent paragraphs.
I TABLE III
4
Summary of IOA Recommended Failure Criticalities I
Criticality:
SEADS
SUMS
FFSSO
SILTS
ACIP
SSO
I TOTAL
4
1/1
1
1 I
2/IR
m
2/2 3/IR 3/2R 3/3
4
16
5
26
22
7
8O
TOTAL
5
16
5
26
22
7
81
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Of the failure modes analyzed, one was determined to be a
critical item. A summary of the IOA recommended critical items
is presented in Table IV.
I TABLE IV
4
Criticality:
SEADS
SUMS
FFSSO
SILTS
ACIP
SSO
TOTAL
Summary of IOA Recommended Critical Items
i/I
1
m
1
2/IR 2/2 3/IR
I
m
3/2R 3/3 TOTAL
1
1
The scheme for assigning IOA assessment (Appendix C) and analysis
(Appendix E) worksheet numbers is shown in Table V.
I Table V IOA Worksheet Numbers I
+ +
] Component IOA ID Number I
÷ +
SEADS
SUMS
FFSSO
SILTS
ACIP
SSO
OEX-100 TO OEX-105
OEX-200 TO OEX-215
OEX-300 TO OEX-304
OEX-400 TO OEX-426
OEX-500 TO OEX-521
OEX-600 TO OEX-606
4.1 SEADS Assessment Results
The assessment between the IOA failure modes and the Post 51-L
NASA FMEAbaseline produced five issues. One issue involved the
SEADS Nose Cap Assembly (MDAC ID i00) that had no corresponding
NASA FMEA. It was decided to drop this FMEA/CIL since the item
is really part of the Orbiter structure, plus it is protected by
the tile. THe other four issues involve components that had no
corresponding NASA FMEAs which should be addressed. However,
their criticality level is only 3/3.
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4.2 SUMSAssessment Results
The IOA analysis generated sixteen failure modes from the ST/MS
experiment. The assessment between the SUMS failure modes and
the Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline produced five issues. One
issue involved the SUMSInstrument Assembly (MDAC ID 200) (NASA
FMEA FWFS 02-1) difference in criticality level. The other four
issues involved components that had no corresponding NASA FMEAS
which should be addressed. However, their criticality level is
only 3/3.
4.3 FFSSO Assessment Results
During the assessment, five FFSSO failure modes were compared to
the Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline which produced three issues.
One issue involved the PCM Slave #2 (MDAC ID 300) (NASA FMEA
FWFS01-1) criticality level. The other two issues involved
components that had no corresponding NASA FMEAs which should be
addressed. However, their criticality level is only 3/3.
4.4 SILTS Assessment Results
The IOA analysis produced twenty six failure modes from the SILTS
experiment. The assessment between the SILTS failure modes and
the Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline produced two issues. Both
these issues involved components that had no corresponding NASA
FMEAs which should be addressed. However, their criticality
level is only 3/3.
4.5 ACIP Assessment Results
In assessing the twenty two ACIP IOA failure modes and the Post
51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline, eight issues were identified. All
these issues involved components that had no corresponding NASA
FMEAs which should be addressed. However, their criticality
level is only 3/3.
4.6 SSO Assessment Results
Seven IOA failure modes were generated for the SSO. The
assessment between these and the Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline
produced two issues. One issue involved FDM-FMRI, FMF3 (NASA
FMEA ACIP08-1) which was only on the OV099 vehicle, thus FMEA no
longer required. The other issue involved transducers, sensors
(MDAC ID 606). These were not addressed in the NASA FMEAS.
However, their criticality level is only 3/3.
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
ACIP
CIL
CMD
COMM
CRIT
D&C
DCM
DFI
DHE
DPS
EI
F
F
FFSSO
FLCA
FMEA
ft
FWD
GFE
GMT
GN2
GSE
HIRAP
HTR
HW
ICM
IOA
IR
JSC
MADS
MDAC
MDHE
MDM
N2
NASA
NSTS
OEX
OI
OPS
PCI
PCM
PCMMU
PWR
RCDR
RTD
SCM
SEADS
- Aerodynamic Coefficient Instrumentation Package
- Critical Items List
- Command, Commander
- Communication
- Criticality
- Displays and Controls
- Display and Control Module
- Development Flight Instrumentation
- Data-Handling Electronics
- Data Processing System (Subsystem)
- Entry Interface
- Fahrenheit
- Functional
- Forward Fuselage Support System for OEX
- Forward Load Control Assembly
- Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
- Feet
- Forward
- Government Furnished Equipment
- Greenwich Mean Time
- Gaseous Nitrogen
- Ground Support Equipment
- High-Resolution Accelerometer Package
- Heater
- Hardware
- Interface Control Module
- Independent Orbiter Assessment
- Infrared
- Johnson Space Center
- Modular Auxiliary Data System
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Mini Data-Handling Electronics
- Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
- Nitrogen
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- National Space Transportation System
- Orbiter Experiments
- Operational Instrumentation
- Operations Sequence
- Potential Critical Item
- Pulse Code Modulation
- Pulse Code Modulation Master Unit
- Power
- Recorder
- Resistance Temperature Device
- System Control Module
- Shuttle Entry Air Data System
A-I
ACRONYMS
SILTS
SSO
STS
SUMS
TAA
TAGIP
TPS
TVS
- Shuttle Infrared Leeside Temperature Sensor
- Space Shuttle Orbiter
- Space Transportation System
- Shuttle Upper Atmosphere Mass Spectrometer
- Triaxial Angular Accelerometer
- Triaxial Angular Accelerometer
- Thermal Protection System
- Triaxial Vibration Sensor
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I
B.2
B.3
Definitions
Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AO___AA- begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (cAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCy CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE {MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(OPS)
M C - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
B-2
MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OP___SS- software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION pHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORB_T pHAS_ - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
B-3
APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL. 10 October 1986, was employed with the
following amplifications and additions•
Ii
•
•
•
o
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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ii.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed•
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection•
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
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DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.3 OEX-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
The IOA analysis was performed to the component or assembly level of
the OEX subsystem• The analysis considered the worst case effects
of the hardware or functional failure on the subsystem, mission, and
crew and vehicle safety.
I• Experiments which develop problems which do not impact the
operation and safety of the orbiter will be classifed
Criticality 3.
Rationale: Loss of mission will refer to the overall orbiter
mission not individual elements•
• Analysis was only conducted on present experiments and support
systems planned for future missions.
Rationale: Experiments and support systems flown in the part
which are not manifested on future mission are
excluded from FMEA/CIL analysis.
• OASIS Experiment excluded from this analysis.
Rationale: OASIS is considered a payload by the Orbiter Project
Office and is thus excluded from this analysis•
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DETAILED ASSESSMENT
This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated
during the assessment of this subsystem. The information on
these worksheets facilitates the comparison of the NASA FMEA/CIL
(Pre and Post 51-L) to the IOA detailed analysis worksheets
included in Appendix E. Each of these worksheets identifies the
NASA FMEA being assessed, corresponding MDAC Analysis Worksheet
ID (Appendix E), hardware item, criticality, redundancy screens,
and recommendations. For each failure mode, the highest assessed
hardware and functional criticality is compared and discrepancies
noted as "N" in the compare row under the column where the
discrepancy occurred.
LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike)" all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
2R =_Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission
Redundancy Screens A, B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
NASA Data :
Baseline
New
= NASA FMEA/CIL
= Baseline with Proposed Post 51-L Changes
CIL Item :
X = Included in CIL
Compare Row :
N = Non compare for that column (deviation)
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-100
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX
i00
SEADS NOSE CAP ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO NASA FMEA EXIST ON THIS. HOWEVER, SINCE THE NOSE CONE IS
PROTECTED BY THE TILES, IT MAY BE THAT THIS ISN'T CONSIDERED TO
BE A CREDIBLE FAILURE. THE NOSE CONE IS ALSO CONSIDERED
STRUCTURE.
REPORT DATE 02/05/88 C-2
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-101
NASA FMEA #: SED01-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: i01
ITEM: PRESSURE PORT (14)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: OEX-102
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX
102
PRESSURE PORT (14 )
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST : J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE WHICH COULD RESULT IN TOTAL LOSS OF
EXPERIMENT DATA.
REPORT DATE 02/05/88 C-4
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-103
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX
103
PRESSURE TRANSDUCERS (28)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C 3 *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/05/88 C-5
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
OEX-104
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
OEX
104
RESISTANCE TEMPERATURE DEVICE (8)
J. COMPTON
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[313 ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
[ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-105
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 105
ITEM: RADIOMETER (6)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-200
NASA FMEA #: FWFS02-1, SUMS I, 2, 3, 4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX
200
SUMS INSTRUMENT ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FWFS02-1 COVERS THE FAILURE AS THE WHOLE INSTRUMENT, WHICH THIS
ANALYSIS ALSO DOES. i, 2, 3, AND 4 ARE INTERFACE FAILURES
BETWEEN UNIT AND STRUCTURE RESULTING IN SAME LEVEL OF FAILURES.
FMEAS TO THIS LEVEL ARE NOT NEEDED. RECOMMEND DELETING i, 2, 3,
AND 4 SINCE THEY ARE REDUNDANT FMEAS TO FWFS02-1. THERE IS
NOTHING REDUNDANT ABOUT THE UNIT - THERE IS ONLY ONE. ASSUME IR
CAME FROM POSSIBLE INTERFERENCE WITH NOSE GEAR CAUSING POSSIBLE
VEHICLE DAMAGE AND/OR CREW INJURY.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-201
NASA FMEA #: FWFS02-2, SUMS-20, 21, 22
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX
201
SUMS INSTRUMENT ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA FMEA ADDRESSES ALL INTERNAL FAILURES OF THE SUMS PACKAGE.
FWFS02-2 ONLY ADDRESSES EXCESSIVE CURRENT-SHORT. SUMS 20, 21,
AND 22 ARE INTERFACE FAILURES.
REPORT DATE 02/05/88 C-9
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: OEX-202
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX
202
PRESSURE ORIFICE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 3 [ ] [ ] [ 3 [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IN KEEPING WITH THE LEVEL OF DETAIL OF THE OTHER FMEAS.
THERE WAS NOT A NASA FMEA ON THIS.
HOWEVER,
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-203
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 203
ITEM: INLET SYSTEM
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IN KEEPING WITH THE LEVEL OF DETAIL OF THE OTHER FMEA'S.
HOWEVER, THERE WAS NOT A NASA FMEA ON THIS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-204
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 204
ITEM: INLET SYSTEM
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C 3/3 ] C ] [ ] C ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IN KEEPING WITH THE LEVEL OF DETAIL OF THE OTHER FMEAS.
THERE WAS NOT A NASA FMEA ON THIS.
HOWEVER,
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-205
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 205
ITEM: INLET SYSTEM
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IN KEEPING WITH THE LEVEL OF DETAIL OF THE OTHER FMEAS.
THERE WAS NOT A NASA FMEA ON THIS.
HOWEVER,
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-206
NASA FMEA #: SUMS-5 AND 7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX/EPD&C
206
SUMS ION PUMP POWER (FLC-3)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] C ] C ] [ ]
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] C ]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
SUMS-5 ALSO COVERS INSTRUMENT POWER (SEE OEX-208).
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: OEX-207
NASA FMEA #: SUMS-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX/EPD&C
207
SUMS ION PUMP POWER (FLC-3)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
SUMS-6 IS GENERIC FOR ANY SHORT IN THE PACKAGE.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-208
NASA FMEA #: SUMS-5, 7 AND 19
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
OEX/EPD&C
208
SUMS INSTRUMENT POWER (FLC-3)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
SUMS-5 ALSO COVERS ION PUMP POWER (SEE OEX-206).
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
OEX-209
SUMS-6
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
OEX/EPD&C
209
SUMS INSTRUMENT POWER (FLC-3)
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
SUMS-6 IS GENERIC FOR ANY SHORT IN THE PACKAGE.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-210
NASA FMEA #: SUMS-8 AND 15
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX/EPD&C
210
SUMS VACUUM MAINTENANCE POWER (FLC-3)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
SUMS-8 AND 15 ARE REDUNDANT FMEAS; ONE COULD BE DELETED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA DATA:
OEX-211 BASELINE [
SUMS-6 NEW [
OEX/EPD&C
211
SUMS VACUUM MAINTENANCE POWER (FLC-3)
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
SUMS-6 IS GENERIC FOR ANY SHORT IN THE PACKAGE.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-212
NASA FMEA #: SUMS-9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX/EPD&C
212
PCM TO SUMS COMM. - PCM CLOCK
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-213
NASA FMEA #: SUMS-10
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX/EPD&C
213
PCM TO SUMS COMM. - DATA STROBE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
REDUNDANCY SCREENSCRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-214
NASA FMEA #: SUMS-II, 12, 16 AND 18
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
OEX/EPD&C
214
SUMS TO PCM COMM. - DIGITAL DATA
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEAS WERE WRITTEN TO COVER THE EXCHANGE OF DIGITAL DATA
THROUGH EACH PATH. THIS FMEA LUMPED THEM ALL TOGETHER.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-215
NASA FMEA #: SUMS-13, 14 AND 17
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX/EPD&C
215
SUMS TO PCM COMM. - ANALOG DATA
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
• (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEAS WERE WRITTEN TO COVER THE EXCHANGE OF ANALOG DATA
THROUGH EACH PATH. THIS FMEA LUMPED THEM ALL TOGETHER.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-300
NASA FMEA #: FWFS01-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
OEX
300
PULSE CODE MODULATOR - SLAVE #2
J. COMPTON
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
C ] C ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PCM SLAVE IS NOT REDUNDANT. ASSUME IR CRITICALITY CAME FROM
POSSIBLE INTERFERENCE WITH NOSE GEAR DEPLOYMENT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-301
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX
301
PULSE CODE MODULATOR - SLAVE #2
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NASA DID NOT ADDRESS INTERNAL FAILURE OF UNIT.
[ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ 3
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-302
NASA FMEA #: FWFS03-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX
302
STATIC PRESSURE TRANSDUCER (12)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-303
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX
303
RESISTANCE TEMPERATURE DEVICE (7)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C3/3 ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THERE ARE NO NASA FMEAS ON THE RTDS.
[ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-304
NASA FMEA #: FWFS04-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX
304
TEMPERATURE SIGNAL CONDITIONER (8)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-400
NASA FMEA #: (SEE REMARKS)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX
4O0
PRESSURE SYSTEM AND DCM MOUNT
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FMEA: PRESSURE i, 2, 5, 10, 15, 18, 22; PRESSURE WINDOW 2, 4, 6;
PRESSURE (PIN PULLERS) I, 3; DCM STRUCTURE I, 4; DOME ASSY 12;
DOME ASSY (BULKHEAD ASSY) I, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.
NASA FMEAS COVER SUPPORT STRUCTURES, THEN BREAKDOWN MOUNTS AND
SUPPORTS INTO SMALLER PIECES. THIS FMEA COMBINES ALL THESE
PIECES INTO ONE GENERAL CATEGORY SINCE THE CRITICALITY IS THE
SAME. OTHER OEX EXPERIMENT HARDWARE WAS NOT BROKEN DOWN TO THIS
LEVEL ON THE NASA FMEAS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
OEX-401
PRESSURE 4
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 401
ITEM: GN2 TANKS
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
J. COMPTON
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
] [ ] C
] [ ] [
] C ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-402
NASA FMEA #: PRESSURE 6
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 402
ITEM: FILL VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
[
C
C
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] *
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-403
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 403
ITEM: RUPTURE DISK
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA ONLY ADDRESSES IF DISK LOSSES PRESSURE.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-404
NASA FMEA #: PRESSURE 7
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 404
ITEM: RUPTURE DISK
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
REDUNDANCY SCREENSCRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] ,
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-405
NASA FMEA #: PRESSURE 8
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 405
ITEM: FILTER
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
] C ] C
] C ] [
] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] *
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
OEX-406
PRESSURE 9
OEX/EPD&C
406
LATCHING SOLENOID VALVE
J. COMPTON
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
OEX-407
PRESSURE ii
OEX
407
CHECK VALVE
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
] [ ] C
] [ ] [
] [ ] C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
] C ] *
] C ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/05/88 C-36
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: OEX-408
NASA FMEA #: PRESSURE14
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDACID: 408
ITEM: FILTER
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
[
[
[
CIL
ITEM
] C ] *
] [ ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-409
NASA FMEA #: PRESSURE 16
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 409
ITEM: CHECK VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
C
C
C
CIL
ITEM
] C ] *
] [ ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: OEX-410
NASA FMEA #: PRESSURE 17
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 410
ITEM: CHECK VALVES
LEAD ANALYST : J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
[
[
[
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] ,
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD  DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-411
NASA FMEA #: PRESSURE 20
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 411
ITEM: FILTER
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
[
[
[
CIL
ITEM
] C ] *
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-412
NASA FMEA #: PRESSURE 21
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID :
ITEM:
OEX
412
PRESSURE REDUCTION COIL
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: OEX-413
NASA FMEA #: PRESSURE21
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX
413
PRESSUREREDUCTIONCOIL
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-415
NASA FMEA #: PRESSURE (WINDOW) 1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 415
ITEM: ORIFICES
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-416
NASA FMEA #: PRESSURE (PIN PULLER) 4
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 416
ITEM: PIN PULLERS
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-417
NASA FMEA #: (SEE REMARKS)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX/EPD&C
417
HEATER SWITCH, SILTS
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FMEA: PRESSURE 3, DCM STRUCTURE 5.
NASA FMEAS FOR THERMAL CONTROL OF PRESSURE SYSTEM AND DCM; DOES
NOT COVER THIS SWITCH SPECIFICALLY.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-418
NASA FMEA #: (SEE REMARKS)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: OEX/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 418
ITEM: THERMOSTAT (3)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FMEA: PRESSURE 9; DCM STRUCTURE 5; DCM ELECTRONICS i, 2, 3; DOME
ASSY 9.
INCLUDES NASA FMEAS ON THERMAL CONTROL PLUS SPECIFIC FMEAS ON
THERMOSTATS.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: OEX-419
NASA FMEA #: (SEE REMARKS)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDACID: 419
ITEM: HEATERS (3)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FMEA: PRESSURE 3; DCM STRUCTURE 5; DCM ELECTRONICS 4, 5, 6; DOME
ASSY 9; DOME ASSY (BLACK BODY ASSY) i.
INCLUDES NASA FMEAS ON THERMAL CONTROL PLUS SPECIFIC FMEAS ON
HEATERS.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-420
NASA FMEA #: (SEE REMARKS)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX
420
DATA CONTROL MODULE (DCM)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FMEA: DCM STRUCTURE 2, 3; DCM ELECTRONICS 8, 9, I0, Ii, 12, 13,
14, 15, 16.
NASA FMEAS WENT INSIDE BOX AND ITS INTERFACES. THIS LEVEL OF
DETAIL NOT REQUIRED SINCE CRITICALITY IS 3/3 FOR WHOLE MODULE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: OEX-421
NASA FMEA #: DCMELECTRONICS7
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
OEX/EPD&C
421
SOLENOID RELAY, DCM
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
C
C
[
CIL
ITEM
] C ] *
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-422
NASA FMEA #: DCM ELECTRONICS 7
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX/EPD&C
422
SOLENOID RELAY, DCM
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ]
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
[
[
[
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-423
NASA FMEA #: (SEE REMARKS)
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 423
ITEM: WINDOW ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PRESSURE WINDOW 3, 5, 7; PRESSURE (PIN PULLERS) 2, 5; DOME ASSY
i, 2; DOME (WINDOW ASSY) i, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9.
THIS FMEA ADDRESSES THE COMPLETE WINDOW ASSY AND ITS INTERFACES
AS A WHOLE. THERE ARE A LOT OF NASA FMEAS WHICH GO BELOW THIS
LEVEL, BUT ALL THE CRITICALITIES ARE 3/3. THIS LEVEL OF DETAIL
NOT CONSISTENT WITH OTHER OEX EXPERIMENTS.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-424
NASA FMEA #: (SEE REMARKS)
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 424
ITEM: CAMERA ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC a B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FMEA: PRESSURE 19; DOME ASSY 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, i0, 13; DOME ASSY
(CAMERA POINT MECH.) I, 2, 3, 4, 5.
THIS FMEA ADDRESSES THE COMPLETE CAMERA ASSEMBLY AND ITS
INTERFACES AS A WHOLE. THERE ARE A LOT OF NASA FMEAS WHICH GO
BELOW THIS LEVEL, BUT ALL THE CRITICALITIES ARE 3/3. THIS LEVEL
OF DETAIL NOT CONSISTENT WITH OTHER OEX EXPERIMENTS.
REPORT DATE 02/05/88 C-52
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT,DATE:9/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: OEX-425
NASA FMEA #: (SEE REMARKS)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 425
ITEM: BLACKBODY ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FMEA: DOME ASSY ii; DOME ASSY (BLACK BODY ASSY) i, 2, 3, 4, 5,
6, 7.
NASA HAS ONE FMEA AT THIS LEVEL, THEN SEVEN MORE FMEAS AT GREATER
DETAIL. OVER ALL CRITICALITY IS 3/3; THUS GREATER DETAIL NOT
REQUIRED NOR CONSISTENT WITH OTHER OEX EXPERIMENTS.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
OEX-426
OEX/EPD&C
426
SILTS ENABLE SWITCH
J. COMPTON
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
C ]
C ]
[ ]
B C
[ ] C ]
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 13 ] [ ] C 3 C 3 [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO NASA FMEA EXISTS ON THIS SWITCH.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/05/88 C-54
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-500
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX
500
TRIAXIAL ACCELEROMETER/GYRO INSTRUMENT PACKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
REDUNDANCY SCREENSCRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEAS ONLY ADDRESSED INTERFACES, NOT ACTUAL HARDWARE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-501
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX
501
TRIAXIAL ANGULAR ACCELEROMETER
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEAS ONLY ADDRESSED INTERFACES, NOT ACTUAL HARDWARE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-502
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX
502
TRIAXIAL VIBRATION SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEAS ONLY ADDRESSED INTERFACES, NOT ACTUAL HARDWARE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-503
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX
503
HIGH RESOLUTION LINEAR ACCELEROMETER PACKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] C ] *
] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEAS ONLY ADDRESSED INTERFACES, NOT ACTUAL HARDWARE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-504
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX
504
DATA HANDLING ELECTRONICS
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEAS ONLY ADDRESSED INTERFACES, NOT ACTUAL HARDWARE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: OEX-505
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX
505
MINI DATA HANDLING ELECTRONICS
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] C ] *
] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEAS ONLY ADDRESSED INTERFACES, NOT ACTUAL HARDWARE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-506
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 506
ITEM: PCM SLAVE
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
C ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] C ] *
C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEAS ONLY ADDRESSED INTERFACES, NOT ACTUAL HARDWARE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-507
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 507
ITEM: PCM MASTER
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEAS ONLY ADDRESSED INTERFACES, NOT ACTUAL HARDWARE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-508
NASA FMEA #: ACIP06-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX
508
PAYLOAD TIMING BUFFER GMT #8
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
OEX-509
ACIP01-1
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
OEX/EPD&C
5O9
ISOLATION DIODE-ACIP ON CMD
J. COMPTON
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
J E i c 3
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-510
NASA FMEA #: ACIP01-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX/EPD&C
510
ISOLATION DIODE-ACIP ON CMD
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-511
NASA FMEA #: ACIP02-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX/EPD&C
511
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER-42
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
[
[
[
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-512
NASA FMEA #: ACIP02-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX/EPD&C
512
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER-42
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
C
C
C
CIL
ITEM
] C ] *
] C ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-513
NASA FMEA #: ACIP03-1
SUBSYSTEM: OEX/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 513
ITEM: RESISTOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-514
NASA FMEA #: ACIP04-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX/EPD&C
514
ACIP HEATER SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: OEX-515
NASA FMEA #: ACIP04-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX/EPD&C
515
ACIP HEATER SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ]
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] C ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-516
NASA FMEA #: ACIP05-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX/EPD&C
516
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER-41
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
[
[
[
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] ,
] [ ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-517
NASA FMEA #: ACIP05-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX/EPD&C
517
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER-41
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
C
[
[
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] [ ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-518
NASA FMEA #: ACIPI4-1
SUBSYSTEM: OEX/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 518
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
] [ ] [
] C ] C
] C ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: OEX-519
NASA FMEA #: ACIPI4-2
SUBSYSTEM: OEX/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 519
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-520
NASA FMEA #: ACIPI2-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX/EPD&C
52O
ISOLATION DIODE-ACIP CALIB
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
C
C
C
CIL
ITEM
] C ] *
] C ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: OEX-521
NASA FMEA #: ACIP12-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX/EPD&C
521
ISOLATION DIODE-ACIP CALIB
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
[
[
[
CIL
ITEM
] C ] *
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-600
NASA FMEA #: ACIP07-1
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: 600
ITEM: OEX RECORDER
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-601
NASA FMEA #: ACIPI0-1
SUBSYSTEM: OEX/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 601
ITEM: HYBRID RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B
C ]
C ]
C ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
C
C
C
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] C ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-602
NASA FMEA #: ACIPI0-2
SUBSYSTEM: OEX/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 602
ITEM: HYBRID RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENTID: OEX-603
NASA FMEA #: ACIPII-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX/EPD&C
603
ISOLATION DIODE-OEX PCM/RCDRON
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REM_:
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/05/88 C-80
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-604
NASA FMEA #: ACIPII-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX/EPD&C
604
ISOLATION DIODE-OEX PCM/RCDR ON
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
E ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 02/05/88 C-81
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-605
NASA FMEA #: ACIPI3-1
SUBSYSTEM: OEX/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 605
ITEM: RESISTOR
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / J C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS :
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/05/88 C-82
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-606
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OEX
606
TRANSDUCERS, SENSORS (INSTRUMENTATION)
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THERE ARE NO NASA FMEAS COVERING THE INSTRUMENTATION SENSORS FOR
THE OEX. ALL SENSORS FOR THE OEX ARE TIED TO EQUIPMENT IN THE
SSO.
REPORT DATE 02/05/88 C-83
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 9/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: OEX-1000X
NASA FMEA #: ACIP08-1
SUBSYSTEM: OEX
MDAC ID: i000
ITEM: FDM-FM41, FMF-3
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ITEM WAS ONLY ON OV-099 (CHALLENGER). ASSUME FMEA NOT NEEDED ANY
MORE.
REPORT DATE 02/05/88 C-84
APPENDIX D
CRITICAL ITEMS
NASA FMEA MDAC ID ITEM FAILURE MODE
SED01-1 i01 SEADS PRESSURE PORTS STRUCTURAL FAILURE
D-I

APPENDIX E
DETAILED lS,N_LYSIS
This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA87001-
07, Analysis of the Orbiter Experiment, (21 August 1987). Prior
results were obtained independently and documented before
starting the FMEA/CIL assessment activity. Supplemental analysis
was performed to address failure modes not previously considered
by the IOA. Each sheet identifies the hardware item being
analyzed, parent assembly and function performed. For each
failure mode possible causes are identified, and hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase are determined as
described in NST$ 22206. Instructions for Preparation of FMEA and
CIL, l0 October 1986. Failure mode effects are described at the
bottom of each sheet and worst case criticality is identified at
the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
No new analysis worksheets generated as a result of the
assessment.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/04/88
OEX
I000
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: /
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FDM-FM41, FMF-3
LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON SUBSYS LEAD: J. COMPTON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A [ ] B [ ] c [
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NOT REQUIRED; ITEM WAS ONLY ON OV-099 VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/05/88 E-2
APPENDIX F
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix E.
The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment
Number, NASA criticality and redundancy screen data, and IOA
recommendations.
Appendix F Legend
Code Definition
1 IOA recommends changing the second failure mode
described in the effects field.
2 IOA recommends deleting the IOA failure mode.
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_ Independent Orbiter Assessment
\ Assessment of the Orbiter Experiments FMEA/CIL
\
J _.0_XECUTIVS sumo_Y
( The Mo_ll Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in_
I June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of)1 the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items //
\ Lis t (CIL_w_= given _y _= _ Orblt_ " ---
for--Pre-___ratien e-e-_n_A and CIL. 1O
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Orbiter
Experiments (OEX) hardware, generating draft failure modes and
potential critical items. To preserve independence, this
analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results
contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA
results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with
proposed Post 51-L updates included. A resolution of each
discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional
analysis as required. This report documents the results of that
comparison for the Orbiter OEX hardware.
The IOA product for the OEX analysis consisted of eighty two
failure mode _worksheets _ that resulted in two potential critical
- bY _a_eitems being identified. _ tv ......._,,_ ,,_ _:-_'
1
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